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INTRODUCTION
TEN years ago, Brinley Thomas' excellent conference volume on inter-
national migration1 contained papers mentioning the skills and education
of immigrants, but almost no reference to the special problem of the
emigration of scientists, professionals, and other highly qualified persons.
The recognition of this special problem has been delayed, in my opinion,
by the fact that in most decades the international flow of intellectuals has
been in the form of voluntary exile (caused by political and religious
• developments) and involuntary flight about by persecution).
However, paralleling the waves of Jewish, White-Russian, Hungarian,
• Polish, Irish, and Baltic refugee and emigré intellectuals, was a steady
stream of trained people from the United Kingdom, Scandinavia, the
p LowCountries, Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy who were going to
• the newly opened lands in the United States, Latin America, and the
4 variousnineteenth century empires. These migrations, moreover, were
NOTE: This paper has benefited from the research assistance of Mr. L. Brown,
Mrs. M. Darrough, and from written comments from Mary Jean Bowman and
Robert Myers. It reflects an earlier study undertaken jointly by H. Grubel and me at
the University of Chicago, aided by a Rockefeller Foundation research grant directed
by Harry Johnson. The present research was aided by the Canada Council and the
UBC Research Committee.
1 Brinley Thomas, ed., Economics ol International Migration, London, 1958.
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often only the beginning—the same people or their children moved on to
better prospects, sometimes again as refugees, but more often as a new
"upper class" of migrants soon to be assimilated among the professionals
of their new homeland.
It was, of course, not at all unusual in earlier centuries also to regard
the movements of trained workers and professionals as the best—perhaps
the only—practical means of transmitting information and technology.
My inexpert reading of economic history, for example, conveys the
impression that the geographic transfer of textile technology, like that
of printing and publishing, was usually accomplished by the flight or
migration of specialists. That these two industries are believed to have
expanded and shifted in this way is important for general economic his-
tory, for they are usually said to be among the leaders, or even harbin-
gers, of general economic growth.2
Such transmissions of information and technology are today the
subject of research by international trade specialists rather than man-
power scholars. The latter, apparently overwhelmed by the difficulties
of conceptualizing manpower planning in developing societies, usually
ignore the outflow of trained personnel, the gain of such personnel from
other countries, and the in- and outflows of students moving from their
homes to schools, or back to final occupations. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that the "brain drain" has emerged as a topic publicized and studied
by economists not usually associated with population, migration, or
scientific policy.3
• The purpose of this paper is to draw attention to three types of
economic research which have been applied to the policy question of the
2This observation is not essential for what follows. It appears to be substantiated,
however, in the first four sources which I consulted: Stevan Dedijer, '"Modern'
Migration," in W. Adams (ed.), TheBrainDrain, New York, 1968, pp. 9—28; W. W.
4 Rostow,The Stages of Economic Growth, Cambridge, 1960; Herbert Butterfield,
The Origins of Modern Science, New York, 1960; and W. C. Dampier, A Shorter
History of Science, New York, 1957.
3 Frederick Harbison, for example, after some important work on education and
manpower planning, has turned to the brain drain. But his earlier volume, C. A.
Myers and F. Harbison, Education, Manpower and Economic Growth, New York,
¶ 1963,neglected the existence of a world open economy in the market for trained
I.-
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brain drain.4 The first of these in time is concerned with welfare theory—
helping to resolve whether and in what sense there couldbea brain drain
problem. This body of literature, of course, stems from official investiga-
tions and reports from the United Kingdom, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development, the United States, and Canada,
and first attracted attention in Harry Johnson's "The Economics of the
'Brain Drain': the Canadian Case," published in 1965 (see footnote 35),
followed by "The International Flow of Human Capital," by Grubel and
Scott, published in 1966 (see footnote 36). Although there were elements
of other approaches in both papers, they depended primarily upon a
search for externalities to indicate whether the departure of scientists and
professionals hurt or helped the country of origin.
A second approach seeks to obtain and explain the demographic
data about migration. Authors have, therefore, specialized in making the
best of censuses, migration returns, and special questionnaires, and in
testing the explanatory power of income, distance, race, religion, and so
forth, as determinants of the migration of skilled and highly qualified
persons. Little of this work proceeded beyond the working-up of
tables and charts, but some of it has followed the lead of L. Sjaastad in
his path-breaking "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration" (see
footnote 6).
A third set of writings has attempted an application of the human
capital approach, pioneered by T. W. Schultz and Gary Becker, for the
analysis not only of education and manpower policies but also of inch-
vidual behavior. In the hands of Grubel and Scott, Wilkinson, Parai,
Among general Anglo-Saxon economists, almost the only important exception to
1, the claim in this statement is Brinley Thomas, whose earlier studies of transatlantic
migration are well-known. On the other hand, the work of mobility specialists work-
ing within a society has turned out to be very useful. One thinks here of Sjaastad,
Weisbrod, Fern, and many others.
To attempt footnotes to establish the integrity of these three approaches would
require a bibliographic article. In any case, the need is greatly reduced by the exist-
ence of two excellent bibliographies: S. Dedijer and L. Svenningson, Brain Drain
andBrainGain, Research Policy Program, Lund, Sweden, 1967; W. G. Scheurer,
John C. Shearer and others, "Selected Bibliography International Movement of High-
Level Human Resources (The 'Brain Drain') by Sender Area," Pennsylvania State
University and University of Chicago Comparative Education Center, May 1967
(mimeographed); and by the bibliographies appended to recent articles by Bowman
and Myers, Grubel and Scott, and Brinley Thomas.244EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
Bowman and Myers, Rashi Fein, and a few others, human capital studies
of migration have not proceeded very far beyond the onerous stage of
obtaining the demographic data according to age, status, education, and
occupation; all that has been attempted is to value the various categories
created, either backward-looking, in terms of the costs and foregone
production embodied in the migrating human capital, or forward-looking,
in terms of the expected future earnings (wealth) of the migrants.
Of course, it is impossible to separate cleanly an exploratory litera-
ture into such distinct methodological "traditions," especially when the
writers are themselves involved in the complex policy questions which
inspired the whole blossoming of the subject. Thus, Johnson's most recent
analyses used international trade theory more than Pigovian welfare eco-
nomics; Weisbrod's work on migration has transcended public finance
and manpower studies; and a number of authors have branched off their
original trails to consider either the general problems of migration for
growth and development in low-income countries or the particular prob-
• lem of the return or nonreturn of students obtaining higher education
• abroad. The uninitiated may, therefore, be particularly grateful for the
appearance of two compilations of papers: The Brain Drain, edited by
Walter Adams, and the forthcoming Proceedings of the 1967 conference
of the International Association for Research in Income and Wealth
which was held in Ireland and which concentrated on the subject of the
brain drain.
Similarly, it is impossible to classify the literature by the various
policy questions to which the authors were, speculatively or econometri-
cally, addressing themselves. Instead, what follows is concerned with
three approaches to migration. The first part deals with the decision to
migrate, referring to a set of studies not apparently consulted by many
economists; the second part deals with migratory human capital, espe-
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THEDECISION TO MIGRATE
A LIST OF THE DETERMINANTS
1.income differentials.The pioneering study by Sjaastad concentrated
on this explanation of migration, which is the one economists would think
of first. Most studies and many policy documents have made much of it.
The British Jones Report estimated that young graduates or Ph.D.'s in
the United States might expect from two to three times the initial salary
obtainable in the United Kingdom; larger ratios of course apply to differ-
entials between less developed countries (LDC's) and western economies.
Economists would naturally think that the present value of income, or
• permanent income, would actually be the relevant concept. A study by
Grubel and Scott summarizes the possible decision rule
• N, N, Na v' Y0,1 P0,1> -c
(I + i—I(1+r,)' < (1+ (I+
where
Y is expected real income,
r is rate of discount,
N is expected life,
P is psychic income,
C is cost of living,
o is the subscript for the country of origin, and
d is the subscript for the country of destination.
If the left-hand side is exceeded by the right-hand side, migration is
"rational."
As the dating and discounting of the real-income items suggest, it is
not merely the initial level but the time-shape of the alternative income
streams which will exercise the most leverage. Indeed, some studies have
explicitly mentioned the different rates of increase of salaries in countries
5 Herbert G. Grubel and Anthony D. Scott, "Determinants of Migration: The
• Highly Skilled," International Migration, 5, No. 2, 1967, p. 128. For fuller informa-
tion, see M. J. Bowman and R. G. Myers, "Schooling, Experience and Gains and
Losses in Human Capital Through Migration," Journal of the American Statistical






I. The Wilson Study of British Scientists, 1964: Reasons for




Low status for scientists in United Kingdom; Science
in United Kingdom is "demoralized" 14.1
Britain "frustrating and depressing" 12.5
Lack of facilities in United Kingdom 10.4
Dissatisfied with conditions (of scientific work) in
United Kingdom 17.5
Greater professional opportunities in North America 38.6
Low salaries in United Kingdom 6.2
Higher salaries in North America 18.0
Higher standard of living in North America 10.6
Higher social standing of scientists in North America 6.5
IL The Hatch-Rudd Study of Graduate Students, 1957-58:
Reasons for Overseas Study
Reason Percentageb
Desire to travel 39
To gain scientific, academic experience 26
To gain other or unspecified forms of experience 18
To work in a particular department or study a particular
subject 15
Availability of better research facilities 6
Financial reasons, higher salary 22
Better opportunities; offered better job but finance not
specified 23
Dissatisfaction with conditions and opportunities in
Britain 19
Sent by employer 4
Other reasons 14
Reasons not stated 3
I
1
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Notes to Table 1
SOURCE: The Brain Drain: Report of the Working Group on Migra-
tion, Committee on Manpower Resources for Science and Technology
(London: HMSO, Cmnd. 3417,1967), PP. 69—70. The origin of the
studies embodied in the report is as follows: James A. Wilson, "The
Depletion of Natural Resources of Human Talent in the United King-
dom;aSpecialAspectof Migration toNorth America, 1952—64,"
doctoraldissertation,UniversityofPittsburgh.(Themajority of
Wilson'srespondentswereyoung naturalscientists witha high
academic background.) Stephen Hatch and Ernest Rudd, University of
Essex, U. K.; survey of the employment former postgraduate students.
The survey included some 3,400 graduates in 1957.
aTotal of 517 respondents.
bT otal of 678 studentswere or had at some time been graduatestu-
dents overseas.
of Europe and in the United States as important determinants of migra-
tion. The higher American starting salaries are contrasted by potential
migrants with slower subsequent pay increases.
The psychic income items will be dealt with as part of the discussion
on living and working conditions. The rates of interest are presumably
equal only if all factors are perfectly mobile and all markets are perfect.
Otherwise one would expect that highly qualified potential migrants
would discount future incomes at rates which reflected both their superior
access to capital markets and their greater certainty about the future.
Whether the formulation is realistic in ascribing to the potential migrant
the imaginative capacity to discount foreign incomes at foreign rates is a
matter for debate, as is the question of whether the factor of risk is small
enough to justify leaving it out of the calculation.
2.Openings and opportunities.It is not obvious that scientists and
professionals are more specialized in any technical sense than are some
less educated members of the labor force. However, many of the latter
are willing to start new lives in new countries by abandoning their old
occupations, while the brain-drain literature suggests that highly educated
manpower frequently moves in search of the precise opening to justify
past training or experience.
Two other aspects of opportunity may be important for scientific
manpower. First, to the extent that scientists are confined by their work
L
____248EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
to universities or institutional laboratories, they may be very concerned
about obtaining opportunities for future advancement and promotion
which are missing in their country of origin. Second, for similar reasons
they may wish to escape from countries in which one or a few institutions
comprehend all their opportunities and to emigrate to countries offering
more ample scientific facilities and in which sideways mobility makes
possible escape to other hierarchies.
3.Living conditions.This is really an omnibus category like "psychic
income." Leaving aside quests for political,religious, or racial non-
discrimination and freedom, many professionals obviously move sim-
ply to obtain better living conditions for themselves, their wives, or their
families. Climate, holiday facilities, schools, welfare, social attitudes, and
styles of living may be magnets. Once again, manpower which custom-
arily communicates with, or travels among, colleagues all over the world
is well qualified to know of such differences.
4.Working conditions.The more creativeis highly qualified man-
• power, the greater its desire for suitably equipped, secluded, or serviced
facilities and premises. Obviously, rich countries can provide potential
immigrants with the greatest promise of research funds, appropriate col-
leagues, time, space, and apparatus.
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE DETERMINANTS
It is easier to list these determinants than to discover their relative
importance. A few studies, however, have been made, chiefly in the
United Kingdom. (See Table 1, which is based on two of these studies.)
Before presenting a summary of this evidence, the limitations of these
studies should be stressed. First, they deal explicitly with emigrants from
the United Kingdom. While that country is an important source of
emigrant scientists, it should be noted that there is an immense number
of migrants from the less developed countries. Second, as in many•
questionnaire-based studies, they report only the percentage of respon-
dents mentioning one or more particular suggested motivations, and the
classifications of these mentions. In particular, these fre-
quencies are not weights or regression coefficients. The two surveys were
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published separately, but the tables are taken from summaries prepared
for the 1967 report of the British working group on migration, The Brain
Drain. (See Table 1, Source.)
The Wilson study concentrates on approximately 500 scientists,
while the broader Hatch-Rudd study considers the about 20 per cent
of a group of 3,400 former British graduate students who had ever gone
overseas. It is not surprising, therefore, that the former study appears to
indicate the greatest importance for scientific and professional opportu-
nity—"working conditions"—in our own listing. Other surveys and the
opinions of experts who have dealt with scientists and Ph.D.'s also fre-
quently assert that money is not the important factor in a migration. The
point is difficult to test because most migrations do appear to bring both
higher lifetime incomes and better facilities to the migrant.
There are, of course, many studies of migration, but few of them
attempt to analyze data on incomes, distance, and cost of moving. One
of the best known is L. Sjaastad's "Costs and Returns of Human Migra-
tion," based in part on his earlier doctoral thesis.6 Attempting to study
disaggregated gross internal U. S. migration, he finds an extraordinary
sensitivity to distance, so that, in miles and 1947-49 dollars, it would
take $106 per year in extra income to induce a migrant already on the
move to migrate an extra 150 miles. Sjaastad's explanation of this
immobility is that his data neglect the uncertainty and loss of psychic
income involved in the extra distance; income is not the only explana-
tory variable.7
• Sjaastad's discovery that income differences may be overshadowed
by other explanations is, of course, consistent with motivation and ques-
• tionnaire studies of highly educated manpower, which tend to stress the
importance of work opportunities and facilities for research and the
• absence of impediments of culture and language. A rather special version
of this finding is set out in R. G. Myers' doctoral thesis8 in which he
investigates the foreign students' nonreturns from study in the United
L. Sjaastad, "Costs and Returns of Human Migration," Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 70, October 1962, pp. 80—93.
7 There are, of course, many recent studies of labor mobility. See the Journal of
Human Resources, spring and summer, 1967.
R. G. Myers, "Study Abroad and the Migration of Human Resources," (Ph.D.
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States, by country of origin. It is found that nonreturn rates are posi-
tively correlated with the level of per capita income in the sending coun-
try, though the correlation is not impressive until national levels of edu-
cation,fields, and types of immigration statusare also considered.
However, this is a surprising finding on incomes alone: it suggests that
the smaller the differential between parent-country and United States
per capita income, the greater the tendency of nationals to remain after
studies in the United States.
Myers also questioned a large sample of Peruvians studying in the
United States, obtaining guesses from each respondent as to his alterna-
five income streams in the United States and Peru. To paraphrase his
summary of his very complex results, he obtained no firm answer to the
question of whether expected earnings distinguished those who had
decided to return home from those who planned to stay in the United
States. It was found that students of low social status on grants and
scholarships in the United States were planning to return to expected low
incomes in Peru. Clearly, considerations other than incomes or expected
earnings were influencing migration decisions.G
FACTORS STRENGTHENING THE DETERMINANTS
It is obvious that conditions in certain countries will create incen-
tives to come or to leave. The literature has given mUch attention to these
conditions because their removal would do much to reduce the brain
• drain. Consequently, it is enough simply to list a few of the more impor-
tant suggestions.
1.Foreign training.In the present context, the main significance of
foreign training is that it familiarizes students with incomes, opportu-
• nities, and working and living conditions elsewhere. While it is possible
that study abroad simply gives would-be emigrants easy access to their
new country, many writers believe that scientists and professionals leave
their native countries because of their experiences as students abroad.
Countries which lack higher education facilities, though able to supply a
Ibid., p. 242.
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flowof persons at the university or professional school entrance level,
are bound to see many of these students go abroad for their education
and stay abroad. It is probable that, in some fields at least, starting pro-
fessional schools at home will not only produce a domestic flow of quali-
fied persons, but also reduce the loss of those who would otherwise stay
abroad after training. (Obviously this assertion holds only if the local
graduates do not go on to foreign postgraduate training. And even then,
as a comparison of migrating physicians from Pakistan and the Philippines
shows, foreign training cannot be the chief explanation of migration.)
2.Domestic income distribution.Each economy may, either as an
interpretation of egalitarianism or in furtherance of other aims, pursue
policies which point up or water down the economic structure of incomes
and occupational status, thus affecting migration behavior. The incomes
of scientists and engineers may be the result of government policy
designed to benefit universities and the government itself by providing
personnel for its own departmental organizations. As one example, the
European custom of overpaying "the professor" of each subject in a
university often not only places the incumbent advantageously with
respect to his professional colleagues at home and even overseas, but also
places him ahead of them in relation to other occupations and social
groups. Senior men in such positions are therefore loath to migrate,
except for political reasons; their juniors, however (perhaps as a direct
financial consequence), are ill paid, of low social status, and interested
in migration.
A second example is well known in the literature. Physicians in the
United Kingdom, following an almost free medical education, receive low
-: stipends as part of social policy on incomes and on welfare. It is possible
that the rate of return on their own input is as high for doctors in Britain
as in countries where doctors pay more for their training and get higher
money incomes later. However, where the two systems coexist, it pays
students to get free training in the United Kingdom and then migrate
elsewhere, which is what they do.
A third example comes from India. The high status and relative
salaries of a few intellectuals, civil servants, and scientists attract thou-
sands of emulators from the same social classes, so many, in fact, that
colleges are flooded by indifferent scholars and the market is flooded with
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uriplaceable graduates. It is said that emigration comes naturally to both
good and bad products of this system, frustrated by the oversupply. Note
the similarity to the European professorship system already mentioned.
Income redistribution may also be accomplished through taxation
and expenditure policy. Scientists who would be highly paid in the
United States may be victims of steeply progressive income tax rates
elsewhere; more generally, their net fiscal position may be negative, thus
driving them out of the country.
Indeed, all too little has been said about the positive (as opposed
to the normative) effects of taxation on the brain drain, or on migration
generally. It is frequently asserted that high tax rates drive people away,
but the information comes from former migrants whose views are not
completely reliable. What about a priori judgments from public finance?
The literature of federal finance, for instance, is full of suggestions about
migration from one province to another, because of net fiscal pressure
(fiscal residuum, in Buchanan's terminology). One would want to know
whether taxes and public services do have this alleged effect on the reten-
tion or repulsion of persons contemplating migration, and whether it is
closely related to other alleged effects, such as the demand for leisure
and other untaxed factor allocations.
In particular, debates about the brain drain make it important to
know whether scientists and engineers, relative to other would-be mi-
grants, are more heavily taxed; are more sensitive to marginal tax incre-
ments; and, are more responsive to the availability of public goods,
transfers, and social services. One aspect of the welfare debate has cen-
•
tered on the "debt" of the emigrant to his home country—is he a debtor
for the services absorbed in his youth, and is he morally bound to repay
this debt? The positive aspect of this question is whether small changes
in services and repayments (i.e. taxes) would alter his choice about
•
leaving.
3.Language and culture.We have already notedthatscientists
• • andengineers are well informed about the advantages and opportunities
elsewhere. Their education and background also help them to feel at
home in a new country. On the other hand, it is conceivable that they
are more sensitive than are less educated persons to the loss of their own
culture, religion, or language. Such considerations may help to explain
-•-•—-—-- ••- -.— —p •-•- -.
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TABLE2
Hatch-Rudd Survey: Reasons for Returning to Britain
Reason Percentagea
Family, domestic 36
Prefer "British way of life" 13
Patriotism, "obligation to this country" 6
Dislike of life overseas 7
End of temporary visit 41
Offer of a good job in Britain 19
Dissatisfaction with job or prospects overseas 11
Other reasons 7
Reasons not stated 3
SOURCE: The Brain Drain:Repor( of the Working Group on Migration,
IIMSO p. 71.
aThe total number returning to Britain was 335.
why migration within the English-speaking world is so high, and why the
much smaller migration within the French-speaking world rarely crosses
over into English-speaking countries.1°
THE TIME DIMENSION OF MIGRATION
It should not be assumed that every highly qualified person who
leaves his country, even to work elsewhere, is necessarily adding to the
brain drain. Far from it—the brain drain is both larger and smaller
than this.
It may be larger because, in spite of its name, the brain drain is
measured by the movement of people with certain occupations or educa-
tions, not by their brains or potential. For many attributes, the rankings
of people vary. Thus, it is obvious that young children, geniuses or not,
will not be counted as part of the brain drain when they move but only
10SeeMichel Olivier, "Algerians, Africans and Frenchmen," Interplay,1, May
1968, pp. 20—25; and Robert Mosse, "France," The Brain Drain, Walter Adams
(ed.), New York, 1968, pp. 157—65.
•0
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when they have acquired higher degrees or acquired academic or scien-
tific positions. The same is true of adults classified as "managerial and
administrative" personnel—the group is usually excluded because it con-
tains many managers and owners of small businesses, some of them fail-
ures and bankrupts. Yet among them are also trained or experienced
entrepreneurs, innovators, consultants, and industrialists. It is doubtful
whether statisticians would have counted Andrew Carnegie in the brain
drain when he moved to the United States at the age of twelve, or Albert
Einstein when he entered Switzerland at seventeen.
Nevertheless, in spite of these serious exclusions, the brain drain is
probably smaller than current statistics suggest because of the difficulty
of netting out the reflux of returning nationals. They return because of
(a) disappointment in their fortunes or conditions in the new country,
or (b) fulfillment of a plan to return after obtaining schooling, training,
experience, or simply the pleasures of living and traveling abroad. A
British study (see Table 2) has attempted to discover by questionnaire
why British scientific emigrants return home, the statistical dif-
ficulties, both of locating former emigrants and of obtaining "correct"
answers from them, are, of course, formidable.
It must also be pointed out that, until death makes return impossi-
ble, it must never be concluded that emigration is "permanent." All aca-
demics know colleagues who have made one or more return journeys to
their homeland. They know that this process can take place at various
ages and for a variety of personal reasons as well as for motives easily
classified as "economic." The difficulties here are similar to those con-
• fronting the demographer estimating "average size of family" for a still
fertile population. Just as parents add to their families after their first
batch of children are nearly grown up, so older emigrants may begin to
seek or accept positions in their homelands. Such a reflux has under-
standably long been visible among former European political refugees,
but is also evident among those whose move was purely economic or
professional. Hence, flow estimates of the brain drain must always be
overestimates of permanent emigration.
However, the most important category of returning emigrants is
undoubtedly the group of students and short-term appointees (often post-
doctoral fellows). The accompanying panels (see Table 3) give some
estimates of the Swedish, British, and Canadian refiux from this source—
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TABLE 3
Drain Re flux Net
Sweden: Citizens with university degree




United Kingdom: (a) Holders of Ph.D. in a science
(total outward movement,(return of those on
1957—6 1) fellowships &
temporary appointments)
1,548 910 638
(b) Degrees issued by British universities in 1965—
engineering and technologyandscience
Engin. and Tech. 230 75 155
Science 460 345 115
Total 690 420 270
(c) High degreesinengineering and science
Engin. 106 16 90
Science 477 152 325
Total 583 168 415
Canada: Citizens with economics degrees
(moving to or trained in the U.S.,(U.S. trained,
now in Canada or U.S.) now in Canada)
107 63 44
SOURCE: Sweden, Goran Friborg, "A First, Preliminary Report
Regarding the Migration of Scientists to and from Sweden," Committee
on Research Economics, Swedish Research Council, Stockholm, Report
No. 20, (mimeographed). United Kingdom (a), rearranged from Emigra-
lion of Scientists (toni the United Kingdom, Report of a Committee
Appointedby the Council of the Royal Society, London, the Royal
Society, 1963, summarized in Minerva,1, Spring, 1963, pp. 358—60;
(b)and(c),The Brain Drain, p.24. Canada, Estimates from Anthony
D.Scott,and Herbert G. Grubel,"FluxandReflux: The International
Migrationof CanadianEconomists"(forthcoming).
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around 50percent of the emigration that might be recorded by statisti-
cians who depend on official returns, such as those published by the
United States Immigration Service.
WAVES: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DIMENSION OF
MIGRATION BEHAVIOR
Some useful study has been made of the social influences on migra-
tion, quite apart from those characteristics of national economies strength-
ening influential determinants mentioned previously. In particular, it is
worth noting that brain drains do not seem to have been steady flows,
but irregular and cumulative movements. There are some obvious reasons
for this, but here it may be useful to mention some unexpected aspects
of the flow.
First, because in theory the brain drain is caused by a disequilib-
rium, we should expect it to be spasmodic, commencing in response to
some change in the international economy's factor or goods markets and
ending when population movements are no longer required. (However,
this is a simplistic and static view. It is possible to imagine countries
steadily supporting the education of their sons in preparation for occu-
pations abroad. Scottish marine engineers, Nepalese mercenaries, French
cooks, and Swiss watchmakers may be examples. But such steady flows
would hardly be the subjects of brain-drain complaints.)
• Furthermore, emigration or immigration may be interrupted or pre-
vented by war. Thereafter the migration may be twice as large as the
initial disequilibirum would indicate. Similarly, a potential brain drain
• may be delayed by shortages of people of the right age or sex. This is a
"bottleneck," exogenous but otherwise similar to the endogenous bottle-
necks to be mentioned later.
Second, considering the brain drain simply as an adjustment to an
international factor disequilibrium, we might expect the flow to be largest
at the outset, then to diminish as the gap or disequilibrium was remedied.
However, factor flows are rarely as monotonic as this because the absence
of communications, institutions, or transportation systems is not remedied
until the first units of flow are completed. Thereafter uncertainty is
reduced, communications with home are improved, and removal becomes
simpler. (Marco Polo may move first, but not much time elapses before
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his cousins and their mothers-in-law follow.) We expect all migrations
to be cumulative, at least until the disequilibrium is adjusted.
Third, the brain drain cannot become large until supply bottlenecks
have been removed. An important brain drain must depend heavily upon
the products of local universities and professional schools. If the labor
markets were in equilibrium before the drain began, the subsequent per-
ceived excess demand abroad will be transformed into a large emigration
only after (a) drawing down existing stocks of scientists and profes-
sionals, raising their local demand prices, reducing their incentive to
move during the waiting period (when the price mechanism is attracting
additional students through the necessary training and experience), and
(b) expanding local education facilties, if the excess demand overseas is
larger than can be supplied by these facilities at attractive incomes.
Fourth, demand bottlenecks may also have to be removed. Prior to
the migrations, the countries of destination may have been "making do"
with substitute skills or inputs. The actual creating of vacancies for the
newly discovered sources of professional and scientific manpower may
take time, as may the removal of legal, customary, trade union, or cul-
tural barriers to their employment.
Fifth, emigrants with particular skills or national characteristics may
by their presence create new roles for themselves and their kind which
were foreseen neither by the original professionals or scientists nor by
their employers.
Sixth, the countries of destination may be gradually building up their
educational, industrial, or scientific establishments. Consequently, their
excess demand for qualified persons may grow rather than be satisfied.
In addition to these microeconomic aspects of adjustment to inter-
national disequilibria in the markets for various kinds of educated per-
sons, two particular categories of large and general flow should be picked
out for special mention.
The first of these comprises refugee intellectuals. It goes without
saying that the fleeing of intellectuals from Russia, Germany, Italy,
China, or Hungary at various times in this century can hardly be prop-
erly classified with other categories of brain drain. The motives for
removal are entirely different, and the permanence of their emigration
may depend upon the permanence of the conditions which drove them
abroad. Nevertheless, so different are the motivations, that the existence258EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
of a stream of refugees ought to have created some useful opportunities
for economic research on the brain drain. One interesting circumstance,
for example, is that some countries of destination were merely able to
offer liberty, not necessarily large schools, institutes, or research facilities.
Hence, the capacity of emigré intellectuals to change the environment of
technology or education should be open to study ceteris paribus (instead
of mutatis mutandis, as is so often the case when a brilliant scientist is
invited abroad to work in an already productive environment.) A second,
symmetrical circumstance is that the country of emigration may have
provided all the physical and intellectual environment and facilities nec-
essary to hold and use the refugee productively. His expulsion, therefore,
may illustrate ceteris paribus the effect of the departure of isolated indi-
viduals or groups on an otherwise fruitful scientific atmosphere. Indeed,
it has often seemed to me that the time is ripe for a wise scholar to com-
pare science in Stalinist Russia, from which emigration of dissatisfied
scientists was impossible, with science in Nazi Germany, where emigra-
tion was, for all practical purposes, compulsory.
In any case, it is to be expected that waves of refugees have also
created environments favorable to subsequent migrations. This is not so
much because the potential employers will seek more scientists or engi-
neers from the refugee's country (indeed, the refugees may prevent the
employment of new generations with different beliefs), but because the
refugees may have established openings or vacancies for men with certain
types of ability or training found only in that country. An obvious exam-
ple is the boost given to German and classical literary studies in North
America by German refugees; similar remarks could be made about
Chinese studies in western universities, originally strengthened by scholars
unable or unwilling to return to their homeland, now perhaps awaiting
a stream of younger Chinese archeologists, historians, artists, and literary
specialists trained on the mainland. Similarly, it should be noted that
refugee scholars are somewhat less willing to make concessions to the
educational or scientific traditions of their new countries, because their
• migrations have not involved a voluntary surrender of their own tradi-
tions and approaches, and because they have often been forced to
migrate at a later age than is usual among brain-drain migrants. Unhappy
and stubborn, they may actually make a larger impact than if they
expunged parts of their own past in adjusting to their host's culture.
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Thediscipline of economics can count many such scholars, from the
greatest to the most ordinary recruit of a small college or government
research branch.
The second category comprises the "wave" of educated migrants
accommodating to long waves of economic development, land shortage,
demographic forces, and factor movements across the Atlantic and
national borders. We are almost completely indebted to Brinley Thomas
for this information. Summarized by Walter Adams in his recent book,
it runs as follows:
Why, then, do we view the international flow of talents and skills
in a different perspective from earlier observers? In the first place,
as Brinley Thomas points out, the great outpouring of human capital
in the 19th century from Europe to North America was comple-
mentary to an export of physical capital and unskilled labor. Flow-
ing from the developed countries, it created an infra-structure in
the developing continent and had important feedback effects on the
exporting countries. It resulted, according to Thomas, in a progres-
sive narrowing of the gap between countries in different stages of
development, benefiting both sending and receiving countries.
The current wave of migration, in contrast, has moved in the
opposite direction from that of physical capital.1'
THE SOCIAL VALUE OF HUMAN CAPITAL
EMBODIED IN MIGRANTS
MEASUREMENT
The study of migration generally, and that of the brain drain in par-
ticular, has made much of the "human-capital" approach. By analogy
with capital theory, this approach regards each person as having attached
• to him an amount of wealth equal to the present value of his net future
earnings. While he cannot usually realize this wealth, as he would by
selling a machine or farm that he owned, he can increase its future earn-
ing power by investment in his schooling, on-the-job training, and occu-
pational and regional mobility.
11 Walter Adams, ed., TheBrain Drain, p. 3.
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The importance of the approach lies in the fact that it is the source
of hypotheses about behavior: people's investment in themselves should
be in forms, amounts, and periods which will maximize the value of their
human capital, after making allowance for nonpecuniary types of income
and for leisure. This application is clearly positive. It should lead to the
prediction of decisions about schooling, location, and jobs, and in aggre-
gate, can help to explain group behavior or attitudes to investment in
educational facilities, migration, and to collective bargaining for working
conditions, pensions, and retirement provisions.
At the same time, the human capital approach has been used in a
quasinormative manner in determining rates of return to buttress claims
that too little (or too much) is being spent in aggregate on certain types
of educational facilities, as opposed to social spending on physical capital
and other forms of public goods.
In migration studies, both these approaches are present, and they
ought to be clearly distinguished. Among the positive studies, Sjaastad,
Myers and a number of other writers have explained how migration is
to be regarded as investment in human capital, and have attempted some
measurement of its payoff or rate of return. The estimation of personal
rates of return is difficult, chiefly because it is difficult to discover what
migrants expect certain values to be. The aggregate rate of return, how-
ever, is just as difficult to estimate as an aggregate rate of return to
schooling because of the impossibility, short of a complete (planning)
model, of knowing what rates of pay would exist if all categories of
educated persons were to be changed. In migration studies, it is compara-
tively easy to learn or guess what personal incomes are believed to be in
a certain region, but it is impossible to guess what the pay levels would,
) infact, become if everyone moved where his human wealth would be
maximized.
Normative studies of migration suffer not only from the same diffi-
•M culties (of data, and of aggregation) as the positive or behavioristic
studies, but also from a perceptible tentativeness in the relevant welfare
theory. As with similar problems in land and real estate appraising and
valuation theory and practice, the measurement of the quantity of migrat-
ing human capital must, in a world of adjustment to disequilibrium in
goods and factor markets, depend upon the purpose for which the mea-
surement is to be used. A few examples are: (1) the value of exports of
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human capital, analogous to the balance of trade or similar values of
exports of machines and other capital goods; (2) the "debt" of a migrant
to his homeland; (3) the "balance of indebtedness" between two coun-
tries exchanging migrants; (4) the "supply price" of a country training
additional migrants for "sale"; and (5) the "demand price" of a country
importing additional migrants instead of training its own people.
In the absence of human-capital markets and during disequilibrium
in labor markets, the values of these concepts will differ, though impa-
tient economists may reason that in the long-run with perfect markets
the differences would disappear.
Closer examination of the differences reveals that their source is in
different assumed conditions in which some hypothetical transaction is
to take place. We must ask, for example, if there were a stock of nuclear
scientists for sale, what short-run price would emerge from competition
among the nations? Second, if nuclear scientists were produced for sale,
what long-run price would be determined by interaction of both supply
and demand? Third, if potential emigrants were to buy their right to
• leave from their remaining countrymen, how much would they offer, and
how much would their countrymen demand?
As will be discussed later, a number of such questions can be posed
and indeed have been suggested as bases for international compensation
in brain drain exchanges'2 and as variables in explaining total commu-
nity outlays on education.'3 When the problem of finding quantitative
answersisfaced, however, only four actual techniques have been
suggested:
1.Cost-saving to the country of destination for the human capital
received.
2.Present value of the human capital migrating.
3.The dead-weight, or consumers'-surplus, loss from migration.
4.The reduction in the flow of savings, taxes and public spending.
• These techniques will be reviewed in the following section, emphasis
being given to "cost-saving" estimates.'4
Harry (1 Johnson and others in Walter Adanis (ed.), The Brain Drain.
13 See BurtonA. Weisbrod,External Benefits of Public Education, Princeton:
Industrial Section, Princeton University, 1964.
14 A review of (1) and (2) will be found in Bowman and Myers, op. cit.262EDUCATION AND HUMAN CAPITAL IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS
1.Cost-saving measures.This approach can best be summarized
by suggesting the question which it directly answers: if an immigrant
brings a certain education and experience with him, what are the direct
resource costs and foregone earnings which are avoided by his new
country? The answer, obviously, requires discovering that country's costs
of schooling at various levels (average or marginal costs depending on
whether or not the immigrant is part of a stream); his foregone earnings
(on the assumption that he might otherwise have migrated before his
period of schooling and worked in his new country); or his maintenance
costs (on the assumption that his new country might have sent someone
to his homeland for an education); and making allowance for the degree
to which he worked part-time.
In fact, such estimates follow very closely the methods pioneered by
T. W. Schultz in estimating the human capital embodied in the U.S. labor
force.15 Difficult questions arise about whether or not to use domestic or
foreign values, reflecting differences between alternative approaches to
building up or importing elements of skilled local manpower. But most
of the complexities of the method, which has been extensively used by
Grubel and Scott, Parai, and Wilkinson,'6 lie in problems of data.
Grubel and Scott, basing their estimates on the gross flow of 43,000
scientists and professionals to the United States from 1949 to 1961,
found that the gain to the United States was about $1 billion, or $23,000
per immigrant, considering both full education costs and earnings (pro-
duction) foregone.
The same authors made a more detailed analysis of the influx and
return of foreign students to the United States. In 1963, 75,000 students,
about evenly divided between undergraduates and graduates, absorbed
American educational, maintenance, and travel resources of about $4,300
per student, or a total of $325 million. However, after allowing for self-
support for foreign students, this sum declines to about $175 million.
After further subtracting the "gain" to the United States from the 10 per
15especially T. W. Schultz, "Capital Formation by Education," Journal of
Political Economy, 68, December 1960, pp. 571—83; and The Economic Value of
Education, New York, 1963.
16 References are given in succeeding footnotes for Grubel and Scott, and Louis
Parai. For B. W. Wilkinson, see Studies on the Economics of Education, Occasional
Paper No. 4, Economics and Research Branch, Department of Labour, Ottawa, July
1965.
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cent of foreign students who remain there, and from the studies of
American students abroad, this United States contribution is converted
to a gain of about $16 million per year.
In another study of the economics profession in Canada and the
United States, Grubel and Scott compute the contribution made by
migration, training abroad, and return of students and mature economists
to the stock of academics in the two countries. Here it is found that,
although there are more Canadian economists in American universities
than Americans in Canadian universities, the American contribution to
graduate training of students who eventually returned to Canada out-
weighs in value the net American gain from Canadian migration.
The value of the "reflux" or return homeward of migrants and stu-
dents is therefore one of the most important aspects of the brain drain
question. As Swedish, British, and Canadian studies have shown, there
TABLE 4
"Gains" and "Losses" to Canada
from Professional Migration, 1953—63
(in millions of Canadian Dollars at 1961 prices)
Gain Loss
• Replacement costs of education of professional
manpower 532 292
Replacement cost of foregone earnings during
migrants' schooling 455 240
Total 986 531
Student exchange: cost of educating net excess
of 6,500 Canadians abroad over foreigners
studying in Canada —@$1,800 per student 12
Net Gain to Canada from migrations and study.
abroad (balancing item) — (467)
Total 998 998
SOURCE: Based on data in L. Paa-ai, Immigration and Emigration of
Professional and Skilled ManpowerDuring the Post-WarPeriod,Special
Study No. 1, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1965.
-
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may indeed be such large homeward flows (i.e., not merely flows of
immigrants to offset emigration) from previous emigration as to nullify
the prevailing impression that emigration amounts to a significant pro-
portion of the home output or stock of qualified persons. Furthermore,
to the extent that other persons have been students (in graduate and
professional schools), undertaking postdoctoral research or on-the-job
training, they may not have been registered in any statistical compilation
as migrants. However, their return may produce a more substantial
change in the stock of human capital in their native land than the better
documented flow of permanent migrants.
This may be illustrated by adjusting some calculations by Louis
Parai.'T Coafining himself to the flows to and from Canada of "profes-
sional" manpower, for the period 1953-63, he estimated the gains and
losses shown in Table 4.
The extent to which emigrants eventually return home can be illus-
trated by a sensitivity analysis. The "loss" column in the table measures
the value of emigrant professional human capital for the period 1953-63
to be $531 million (for about 56,000 emigrants). If, as may easily be
the case, the number of emigrants is overstated—through the neglect of
subsequent returns to Canada—by 10 per cent, the residual calculation
of Canada's' net gain could also be out by more than 10 per cent.'8
A striking illustration of the extent to which neglect of returning
emigrants can invalidate gross cost-saving estimatesis provided by
Göran Friborg.'9 Using the Grubel-Scott technique, he first values the
gross annual Swedish loss of scientists and engineers to the United States
at $1.8 million in 1960. "Re-immigration" of highly qualified Swedes
P 17Louis Parai, Immigration and Emigration of Professional and Skilled Manpower
During the Post-War Period, Special Study No. 1, Economic Council of Canada,
Ottawa, 1965, pp. 82—122.
18 For the most part, Canadian emigration measures are residual estimates after
net natural increase, and immigration have been added to census counts. Hence,
professional emigration figures must depend on U. S. Immigration data. But these do
• not count immigrants as Canadian if they are recent arrivals in Canada. Furthermore,
nobody counts U. S. immigrants of Canadian citizenship who return to Canada. See
Parai, Technical Note 8, Table 11 and Table A-45.
19 Göran Friborg, "International Movement of Scientific and Technical Person-
nel," Part IV of Meddelande Nr. 27, Kommitten for Forskningsorganisation och
Forskningsekonomi, (Committee for Research Organization and Economy), Stock-
holm, December 1966.
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TABLE5
Revision: "Net Gain to Canada" from Student Exchange
Canadian Contribution to Schooling
of Foreign Students in Canada
a I Total students 55,760
2Graduate students 11,152
3Undergraduates 44,608
4 Education resource costs —grad.
@$4,143 $ 46,200,000
5 Education resource costs —under-
grad. @$1,800 80,300,000
6 Maintenance costs —50per cent of
students (grad. +undergrad.)@ $1,700 47,400,000
7 Total Canadian contribution
(4) +(5)+(6) $173,900,000
Foreign Contribution to Schooling
of Canadian Students Abroad
8 Total students in U. S. and U. K.a 62,307
9Graduate students 12,329
10Undergraduate 49,978
11 Education resource costs —grad.
@84,143 $ 51,100,000
12 Education resource costs —
undergrad.@ $1,800 90,000,000
13 Maintenance costs —50percent of
students (grad. +undergrad.)@ $1,700 53,100,000





SOURCE: Total students, L. Parai,Immigration and Emigration of
Professionaland Skilled Manpower DuringthePost-War Period,
SpecialStudy No.1, Economic Council of Canada, Ottawa, 1965.
Education resource costs—graduatestudents, A. D. Scott and H. G.
Grubel,"TheInternationalMigrationofCanadian Economists"
(forthcoming),p. 42; undergraduate students, Parai, op.cit., p.123.
Maintenanceasts, Scott and Grubel, op. cit., p.52.
aGraduate/undergraduatoratio assumed similar to United States
(see Doctorate Production in U. S. Universities, 1920—62, National
Academy of Sciences, 1963, p.204) and adjusted for nonreturns.
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from the United States, however, reduces this figure by 80 per cent, to
$350,000, after making allowance for the fact that the returnees are
more highly trained than the emigrants. Friborg suggests that the $80
million per year found by Grubel-Scott for all scientific and engineering
emigration to the United States may also be subject to a similar reduc-
tion to 20 per cent of its gross amount.
Obviously, what is required is a frequency distribution of the nuin-
bers of migrants returning homeward in each subsequent year. Bowman
and Myers do set up a formal individual decision model for the decision
• to return, in which they think that the probability of return home will
decline with the increase in the number of years absent.2° This would
mean that the distribution of returns by one year's group of emigrants
would be heavily concentrated in the early years and would trail out with
a large number never returning. There is, however, little evidence against
which to test these hypotheses. We must be content—if a second-best
• can be achieved—to count the actual returners.
The importance of studies abroad by nonmigrant students requires
further examination of the $12 million figure in Table 4. Parai obtained
this estimate by multiplying 6,500, the "net" number of student-years
abroad (the excess of foreign student-years in Canada over Canadian
student-years abroad), by $1,800 each. This cost-saving to Canada is
obviously understated. Allowance should also be made for the difference
between the costs of graduate and undergraduate schooling, for mainte-
nance costs while away, and for the degree of student sell-support.
In Table 5 the recalculation is shown. It assumes that students every-
•I whereare divided in the same proportions between graduate work and
• undergraduate studies as they are in the United States; that 50 per cent of
students are sell-supporting; that maintenance cost rather than foregone
earnings is the relevant concept for the calculation; that Canadians study-
ing abroad are concentrated in the United States and the United King-
dom (i.e., not in France); and that 10 per cent of graduate students do
not return 21
20 Bowman and Myers, p. 893.
21 The bulk of these calculations was made by Mr. L. Brown, and are merely
summarized here. The chief problem was to get workable assumed proportions for
students in graduate work and college. Paral assumes neither maintenance costs nor
foregone earnings are relevant, saying that the latter, for the student abroad, are in
effect "borne by Canada."
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Thesestudent-exchange modifications nearly double Canada's gain
from Parai's $12 million to $20 million. The most important adjustments
are, of course, the inclusion of maintenance cost and the greater weight
given to the higher education, resource costs in graduate work. It is likely
that most Canadians abroad are in graduate work, whereas many foreign
students in Canada are undergraduates. If this is true, then the $20 mil-
lion represents Canada's gain or "indebtedness" on student exchange.
It is also likely that, with a large number of Canadians abroad doing
graduate work in the United States, the assumed 50 per cent of self-
supporting students is too high. If these likelihoods are correct, then the
Canadian gain is about $22 million, or over $1 million per year, on stu-
dent exchange alone.
On the whole brain-drain calculation, after making some allowance
for returning Canadians and for student exchange, Parai's $467 million
should be raised to at least $485 million, or an average of $44 million
per year over the eleven-year period.tm
2.Present value of human-capital migrating.The techniques of esti-
mating the present value of the human capital embodied in migrants
working, from expected future earnings, are already well examined in
the M. J. Bowman and R. G. Myers article cited23 and are best known
in their employment by Weisbrod in his attempt to measure the gain and
loss of human capital by Clayton County.24 More recently, Rashi Fein
has made a similar calculation for the American South,25 and Myers
himself has made interesting application of the technique to the deci-
sions of Peruvian students in the United States about where to live
permanently.26
As with the cost-saving approach, it is necessary to know the num-
bers of persons migrating and their schooling. Their age becomes partic-
ularly important, because the method attempts to measure the value of
4
22 The returning-Canadian factor is credited above with only $10 million. If, as
suggested in the text earlier, it is really underrated, and should be $100 million, then
the total annual Canadian brain-drain gain on professionals and students would be
over $50 million per year in 1961 prices.
23 Bowman and Myers.
24 Burton A. Weisbrod, op. cii.
25 Rashi Fein, "Education Patterns in Southern Migration," Southern Economic
Journal, 32, 1965—66, pp. 106—24.
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income in the remaining working years. Obviously one of the most impor-
tant questions for any particular study is the decision whether to use
expected future incomes in the country of destination or the country of
origin. If the aim is to estimate the incentive to migrate (as in the Grubel-
Scott formulation reproduced earlier), present values in both places may
be used, and increasing degrees of disaggregation (by age, sex, and pro-
fession) will then be found to increase the understanding of migratory
behavior.
However, the normative or policy usefulness of present-value esti-
mates of migrating human capital is not clear. Rashi Fein, indeed, draws
no conclusions from his briefly reported valuation of southern migra-
tions.27 Bowman and Myers appear to place most stress on the capacity
of the technique to weigh accurately the differing age and skill compo-
sitions of a region's inflows and outflows, thus measuring migration's con-
tribution (in comparison to schooling) to the formation of human capital.
This role can be approximated by cost-saving measures; Wilkinson and
Parai, for example, both make much of the fact that Canada's net gain
from immigration is not merely in differences in the numbers of skilled
or professional peOple coming and leaving, but in the fact that the
immigrants on the average embody more schooling than the emigrants.28
Bowman and Myers,29 and Fein, therefore, can be regarded as taking
this examination one step further by turning from relatively insensitive
cost-of-years-of-schooling estimates to more finely detailed expected earn-
ings of various skills and professions. With their approach, therefore, it
is possible to test the "paradox" that an equal exchange of equally
schooled persons could raise the value of the stock of human capital in
both regions; with the years-of-schooling approach it is not possible to
do this. But I am not convinced that this paradox is the kind of propo-
sition that needs rigorous confirmation, except as propaganda to convince
noneconomists that specialization, the division of labor, and mobility can
be beneficial generally, not simply to the "net gainer" of educated persons.
27 Fein, op.ci:. Seethe reference to his measurements in and Myers,
p.879.
Wilkinson, op.cit., p. 69; Parai,op.ci:., p. 82.
29Bowman and Myers, passirn,especiallyp. 880. These authors are also rightly
concerned to include remigration and with on-the-job training. The effect of the
latter, of course, is much more easily dealt with by present value, than by direct cost,
estimates.
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3.The dead-weight, or consumers'-surplus loss from migration.This
approach, not strictly in the human-capital stream of migration studies,
is more in the tradition of the cost-of-monopoly and cost-of-tariff studies
associated with A. C. Harberger and H. G. Johnson.3° It does not place
a value on the gross amount of human capital migrating, but only on the
"loss of welfare" from a nonmarginal emigration.
Consider a simple competitive economy in which the income of a
certain skill is determined by supply and by the (derived) demand. Then
migration, by reducing the supply of this skill, will: raise the average and
marginal revenue product of this skill; raise its price; alter total income
distribution in its favor, depending on the elasticity of demand for it;
and leave a small dead-weight loss of product (consumers'-surplus)
which does not accrue to the migrants, to the survivors, or other factors.
It is this last concept which, in principle, may be measured.
The concept itself has been fully discussed by Grubel and Scott,3'
• Berry and Soligo,32 and by H. 0. Johnson.33 Only Mishan has attempted
• to measure it for the United Kingdom. (See footnote 38.) He is respond-
ing to the brief and disappointing Chapter IV of the 1967 Brain Drain
report on "The Cost of the Brain Drain." (See source to Table 1.) Here
• the working group briefly reported on the cost of training professionals
and scientists and the "loss of investment" when they migrate. However,
"the true measure of loss to the community is indicated by the value that
might be placed on the productive career of the individual concerned....
The significant point is that for every young high quality engineer who
emigrates to the United States, the British economy in effect presents the
American economy with a gift of the magnitude indicated in these fig-
ures." The figures are that the cost of training for engineers and Ph.D.'s,
respectively, are £ 6,000 and £ 16,000, but the present values of the
30 A. C. Harberger, "Using the Resources at Hand More Effectively," American
Economic Review, 49, May, 1954, pp. 134—46; and H. G. Johnson, "The Economic
Theory of Customs Union," Pakistan Economic Journal, 10, March, 1960, pp. 14—32.
31 Herbert G. Grubel and Anthony D. Scott, "Theory of Migration and Human
Capital," 1967, based on 1965 version (mimeo.).
32 R. A. Berry and R. Soligo, "Some Welfare Aspects of International Migration,"
Yale Economic Growth Center Discussion Paper No. 8, July 7, 1966, (mimeo.).
33 Harry G. Johnson, "Some Economic Aspects of the Brain Drain," Pakistan
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value placed on the careers by employers—i.e., salaries—are £30,000
and
In other words, the working group valued the British "gift" at the
present value of future foreign income. (This position was heavily criti-
cized by Johnson,35 with particular reference to taxes and to externalities,
by Grubel and Scott,36 and later by other "internationalist" writers in
W. Adams' The Brain Drain. (See footnote 2.) Bowman and Myers
appear to accept this measure of loss, externalities aside.)37
Mishan, in a semipopular analysis, in effect rejects the gift as a
measure of British loss and proposes the present value of the area under
the demand curve not accruing to migrants nor survivors—the consumers'
surplus. He makes a rough estimate of this sum, assuming a unitary elas-
ticity of derived demand.38
4.The loss of the flow of savings andof taxes.Forcompleteness
it is necessary to report on two proposed rough measures of national loss
from emigration. The first of these is the loss of future savings, invest-
ment, or capital, and the second is the loss of transfers of public goods
and expenditures from scientists to other citizens.
Consider a growing economy depending on savings and capital
inflows for future per capita income growth. Such an economy may well
• attach more importance to the size and timing of these flows than to the
dead-weight loss of current output. The brain drain will be seen as an
outflow of capital which may be regarded as a "regrettable necessity,"
either unpreventable or desirable for reasons irrelevant here. The drain,
however, is capable of producing future capital benefits via emigrant
remittances homeward. The statistical problem of the "cost" of the drain,
therefore, is to estimate the difference between the flow of savings, if the
emigrants had remained at home (their income minus their consumption
84 Ibid., p. 16. Footnotes suggest that some economic calculations had been made
for the working group, but the whole discussion of "cost" is confined to one page.
85 Harry G. Johnson, "The Economics of the 'Brain Drain': The Canadian Case,"
Minerva, 3. Spring. 1965, pp. 299—3 11.
86GrubeI and Scott, "The International Flow of Human Capital," American
EconomicReview, Papersand Proceedings, 56, May, 1966, pp. 268—74.
Bowman and Myers, pp. 892—93.
88 E. J. Mishan, "The Brain Drain: Why Worry So Much?" New Society,10,
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andtransfers) and the flow via remittances (the recipients' income minus
their consumption and transfers). This has actually been attempted.39
The underlying theory is also discussed by Charles Kindleberger.4°
Indeed, many growth models4' are, to the extent they are quanti-
fiable, capable of measuring absolutely or comparatively the impact of
an outflow of human capital on the growth path and the equilibrium
growth rate.
Second, it would seem possible to undertake a study of the tax-
and-transfer consequences of the brain drain for nonmigrants. Harry
Johnson, in an attempt to discourage the use of the present value of
future incomes as a measure of national loss, has been particularly
emphatic in stressing this valid alternative.42 What is required is a benefit-
cost, or with-and-without-migration analysis of the tax and transfer mech-
anism Within the economy. In static terms, the emigrant will pay certain
taxes from his expected income and receive certain specific benefits (i.e.,
with positive marginal cost). The difference between these two expected
flows is a measure of the loss or gain of the nonmigrating population.
It is possible to make specific assumptions about whose taxes will increase
and what benefits will be altered in the economy's post-migration adjust-
ment; these will enable the benefit-cost analysis to determine which iden-
tifiable income groups, among the surviving population, will actually gain
or lose.
In less static terms, the economist may be able to concentrate his
attention on the impact of the migration on certain generations. To do
39 Constantine Michalopoulos, "Labor Migration and Optimum Population,"
Kyklos, 21, 1968, Fasc. 1, pp. 130—46.
40Charles Kindleberger, "Emigration and Economic Growth," Banca Nazionale
del Lavoro Quarterly Review, 18, September, 1965, pp. 235—54.
See,for example, the models of H. Uzawa on economic growth with a labor
force with embodied capital. Models with vintages of capital goods can shorten their
assumed lives to allow for the emigration of a certain percentage of each vintage of
educated people. The to-be-published paper by Berry and Soligo also has a section
on a dynamic economy, using saving propensities. But itis difficult to see how it
could be used to discuss future growth rates, since itis intended to elucidate the
• dead-weight approach above.
42 H. G. Johnson, in Walter Adams (ed.), The Brain Drain, pp. 83—84, and his
earlier contributions in Minerva. Johnson has, of course, also considered the general
sources of loss: externalities and changes in factor proportions; see the appendix to
his article in the Pakistan Development Review. Brinley Thomas' Minerva article
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so, however, requires that he make assumptions about the adjustment in
• the tax-and-transfer mechanism to reduce or maintain the net payments
to older people (and their adjustments in retiring later and working
• harder); and to reduce or maintain the flows of payments for the welfare
and education of younger generations. It is difficult to know how to make
such assumptions satisfactorily, yet, in the absence of the correct assump-
tion, it is all too easy to bias such analyses to show that the burden is
borne entirely by any of the three generations: old people, contem-
poraries, or children.43
So far, only two clear facts are known: that brain-drain migrants
earn more than average taxpayers, and so presumably make a net fiscal
contribution when they reside in a country with a progressive fiscal sys-
tern; and that their removal carries both a tax source and an expenditure
burden to a new fiscal economy.
POLICY QUESTIONS ABOUT MIGRATION
Behind the schemes for measuring the cost of migration lies the
implicit aim of increasing and maximizing the Gross National Product,
or the GNP per capita.44 It is argued, for example, that a statement sitni-
lar to the balance of payments or the national accounts would enable
nations to adjust schooling, incomes, and migration policies so as to make
the best of the brain drain.
The maximization of GNP, however, is not the only conceivable
policy. Alternative aims may accompany or displace the more conven-
tional income-per-head goal. Four such goals are briefly examined in this
•I section.A review of the literature on marginal vs. large flow emigration,45
and on long-run effects vs. short-run adjustment costs4° is deemed unnec-
I
43An exchange between Thomas, Johnson and myself has already utilized our
respective implicit assumptions on how society would react.
44 Whether income-per-head, or income, is the best variable for maximization is
discussed in Grubel and Scott, "The International Flow of Human Capital." See also
• Berry and Soligo, and Bowman and Myers.
45Grubel and Scott, "The Theory of Migration and Human Capital"; Berry and
Soligo; and Johnson, "Some Economic Aspects of the Brain Drain," make the most
of the marginal-vs.-large-scale-flow distinction, and the loss of GNP to the survivors
of an emigration in the latter circumstances.
46See Grubel and Scott, "The International Flow of Human Capital"; Johnson,
"Some Economic Aspects.. .";andBerry and Soligo.
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essary.The goals surveyed are: (1) the "export" of brains; (2) income
redistribution; (3) achieving external effects; (4) aiding economic growth.
1.The "export" of brains.The human-capital approach automati-
cally leads economists to compare the brain drain to capital movements,
and to frame questions about preventing or assisting it in terms similar
to those applied to the gold drain or to direct investment. Furthermore,
some of the literature has demonstrated that (leaving externalities out of
consideration) circumstances are conceivable in which a brain drain may
even benefit the average surviving nonmigrant.
None of this literature has gone so far as to recommend that, in
certain circumstances, a country selfishly gear up its educational and
on-the-job training systems to assist the highly advantageous migration
of young professionals. For example, some human-capital literature on
the manpower programs of less developed countries compares rates of
return in education with rates on physical-capital projects, but misses
the opportunity to take account of the open nature of the manpower
market, under which rates of return on "exported" schooling may be still
higher than any domestic alternative. Conceivably the best course for
some country might even be to educate allits people to take jobs
elsewhere.
This raises the general question: the brain drain is desirable for the
migrants' own "Scottish" reasons,47 may a brain drain not also be a
desirable social policy for a whole country, either to empty the place and
47 "The noblest prospect which a Scotchman ever sees is the highroad that leads
him to England." James Boswell, Lifeof Samuel Johnson,Chicago, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, 1955.
Underdeveloped countries may also have a ruling elite which extracts a good
schooling for its children from the treasury. This policy allows such children to
migrate, or escape, if domestic political, social, or economic policies should suddenly
become hostile. This point is not often mentioned, although Grubel and Scott,
1966, did stress that education is provided by the older generation for the benefit of
their children, however it is used. Allied points are that the scramble of able intel-
-: lectualsto get ahead of "the mob" of candidates for B. A. degrees in India does
create an incentive to be trained and emigrate (Dandekar, p. 227); and that political
unrest is often a reason for leaving—but education of one's children is an insurance
policy for middle-class people in case of the inevitable unrest in many countries
(Myint, p. 237). Both these discussions are in Adams, The Brain Drain. But neither
these nor other writers seem to recognize that the brain drain may also be part of a
planned export of talent.
—
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allow everyone to do better abroad, or to set up as a profitable, steady
exporter? It is difficult to find large scale examples of assisted brains-
export policies, but the world is full of migrated specialists whose educa-
tion must have been provided in contemplation of their probable emi-
gration. Scottish engineers, Norwegian sea captains, and Viennese psy-
choanalysts, for example, all appear to be products of schools so large
that their founders could never have believed that the home labor mar-
kets would absorb all the graduates.
Of course, the conditions under which an unrequited exodus of
brains could benefit the per capita income of the survivors are already
well laid out in the literature. Roughly, the emigrant must carry with him
less capital (human or physical) than the per person endowment of the
nation as a whole. This condition is fairly easy for unskilled emigrants
to meet, but it is more difficult for the brain drain; by definition, profes-
sional people embody a good deal of capital. (A separate condition
under which emigrants should expect to pay a larger net fiscal contribu-
tion than survivors also works against the desirability of the brain drain
• r as opposed to unskilled emigration.)
Even if these general static conditions weigh against brain exports
as a national policy, are there not conditions under which it may be
desirable? It is not good enough to rule the drain out by assumption,
as is done by Bowman and Myers48 and by Berry and Soligo.49 All these
authors, following the logic of other parts of their models, assert that the
social return on educational outlays becomes zero when the manpower in
which it is embodied moves abroad. Thus they accept Leacock's identifi-
cation of migration with death.5° If we reject this assumption, are there
circumstances under which export would pay off socially?
In the first place, it is by no means inevitable thai such export of
highly qualified persons be unrequited or uncompensated. The discus-
sions of the value of migrants in this paper suggest at least that appro-
• priatenumbers could be found for a pricing process. A number of con-
tributors to the Brain Drain volume and symposium speculated on the
most promising international compensation scheme; a consensus would
have favored payments from the receiving country to the losing country
48 Bowman and Myers, p. 892.
Berry and Soligo, p. 21.
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ratherthan from the emigrant to his homeland. Either of these flows of
payment could, as with the network of small colleges in New England,
justify an investment in teachers and facilities to export professionals
for profit.
Second, even if a swollen drain of brains is uncompensated, it may
bring benefits to the home economy. Chief among these are the benefits
of scientific research and discovery, expedited in the foreign environment,
that will spill back to producers and consumers in the home environment
to a greater extent than if the emigrant scientists had attempted to work
at home. Against these benefits should be set the losses of specific discov-
eries about methods and products which are unlikely to be undertaken,
or undertaken successfully, in foreign environments. (For example, a
medical benefit might best emanate from a western economy laboratory
investigating drugs; but the dispersion abroad of medical scientists,
who would be instrumental in discovering such drugs, might hinder
research in public health techniques, in mass treatment of disease, in
population control, and so on, since these activities depend on the scien-
tists' presence in the society itself.)
Third, a redefinition of national advantage, rejecting the "emigrants
have no national payoff" assumption of Berry, Soligo, Bowman, and
Myers, may implement parents' willingness to pay for children's school-
ing and cause them to view with complaisance their children's leaving
home to prosper in the best environment available, whether overseas or
in their own country. While it is difficult for economists to calculate the
• domestic gain from such a flow abroad, which betters not only the, emi-
grant generation but also its descendants, with no gesture of thanks or
spillover of benefit toward the old country, it is clear that many parents'
behavior does require economists' agreement that some national, social
benefit does exist.If educational investment is to be public, then it
behooves economists to find ways in which to measure this gratification
in the overseas success of children, not to deny that the gratification
offsets whatever costs the drain may also produce.
This is not the place to argue these three points fully. However, they
should be sufficient to indicate that, quite apart from the impact on sur-
vivors now deprived of the complementary inputs from some scientists
and engineers, it is possible to conceive of circumstances in which the
survivors might encourage the export of brains.
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2.Income redistribution.Each nation has a distribution of incomes
brought about by the pricing of its inputs and outputs, and most nations
have government policies which alter this distribution. The redistributive
policies mostly involve tax rates, transfers, and incomes in kind which
differ from person to person. However, each nation can also utilize the
earnings structure of organizations and corporations directly controlled
by the government, and, less effectively, it can invoke government con-
trols on wages and conditions of work.
In connection with the brain drain, for example, the government can
influence the incomes paid to scientists and engineers by either of two
approaches on distinct levels: It may utilize such broad policy measures
as the imposing of income tax rates and exemptions, the fixing of the
average burden of total taxation for real and welfare purposes, and the
provision of free or cheap government services such as hospital services;
or it may adopt special policies such as the manipulation of the level of
incomes in universities, laboratories, and the civil service, and the level
of incomes paid by private employers to scientists and engineers. As
discussed in an earlier section, both approaches may have important
effects on professionals' decisions to remain or leave; a social resolve to
remove the incentive to migrate might therefore well begin by making
sure that the incomes of potential migrants were favorably treated by
• these income redistribution mechanisms.
General redistributive policies involving some degree of progression
in the total fiscal burden on successive income groups are usually not
aimed at professionals and scientists but at "rentiers," those receiving
"unearned incomes" or "surpluses." However, it is difficult to distinguish
those inheriting intelligence from those inheriting real estate; both have
had schooling and both may have similar occupations. Hence, it would
• be unusual to exempt scientists and professionals from the higher levels
of taxation levied on entrepreneurs and capitalists of similar incomes;
• indeed, collection may be stricter and avoidance more difficult on their
institutional incomes.
It follows that the more keenly the nation adheres to general redis-
tribution policies of an egalitarian nature, the more probable isthe
migration of its scientists and engineers, given the net income alterna-
tives abroad.
Special income policies may work either way. Dandekar, in an
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interesting survey of India's brain drain, blames the carryover of a
British policy of paying scientists, civil servants, and professors at Euro-
pean rather than Indian levels. This policy, he says, now attracts "mobs"
of students to courses preparatory for these occupations and so even-
tually creates an excess supply of better men seeking jobs abroad.5'
In a less extreme fashion, the European custom of appointing one highly
paid professor in each field at each university may well attract more
students and low-rank faculty than can be absorbed. This discriminatory
policy of favoring a few incumbents is bound to create a stock of young
or unsuccessful aspirants available for employment abroad.
Special income policies may also work against all members of a
profession and may, therefore, be even more potent as a brain-drain
• stimulant. Harry Johnson, in particular, has pointed out that, although
two professions may yield the same rate of return on costs paid by the
student (fees and employment foregone), and hence be equally attractive,
special income policies may ordain that the first should have high fees
and high lifetime incomes, while the second has cheap (subsidized)
• schooling balanced by low lifetime salaries. In a closed economy, such
an income policy may succeed in allocating acceptable flows of students
to both occupations; but the low lifetime incomes of the second profes-
sion may, in an open economy, drive professionals to migrate to the
higher levels abroad.52
Since itis natural for an economist to suppose that migration is
motivated by income differences,itis not surprising that general os
specific policies which alter these differences, whatever their rationale
• for redistribution, should be viewed as conflicting with mobility policy
and on the whole contributing to the brain drain rather than reducing it.53
Such reasoning, however, should not be allowed to obscure the income
differences which are simply the result of over-all national poverty. For
4 51M. Dandekar, "India," in Walter Adams (ed.), TheBrain Drain, pp.203—32.
52johnson "Some Economic Aspects Johnson takes as his example the low
fees, low incomes, and high rates of migration of British doctors.
For example, in my own work on federal finance, without challenge, I assumed
that regional income redistribution reduced interregional movement by those people
who, by education and wealth, were the least mobile anyway. If such people are
assumed to have less.than-average incomes, then such policies will increase the
mobility of more-than-average-income persons. See "The Goals of Federal Finance,"
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example, itis quite likely that some poor agricultural countries have
much the same income structure as wealthier countries. If migration were
opened up by a relaxation of border restrictions, the same percentage
differences would exist between occupations at all levels of each nation's
income structure, presumably raising the likelihood of migration per
thousand, more for the poor than for the rich.54 All experience suggests,
however, that upper-income, professional, academic, and skilled people
will actually move more readily than low-income, low-skill people. The
point of the example is simply that a brain drain may exist in the absence
of any income redistribution policy in either country.
3.Achieving external effects.Most concern over the brain drain
stems from worry about the loss (or nonrepayment) of the cost of the
education embodied in the migrants, and about the effect on the general
welfare of the survivors. The former is the subject of the schemes of
measurement suggested in the previous section of this paper. The latter
• may be the "dead-weight" loss of consumers' surplus, but this is a tech-
••. nical,economists' concept not even intuitively obvious to laymen. The
remaining explanation of the latter is that men with brains (professionals,
scientists) are different in kind from other men, not just in degree. Like
public goods in the theory of public expenditure, it is their nature either
to exhibit powers of invention, leadership, and organization which are not
• diminished by their employment or application, or, more modestly, sim-
ply to produce uncompensated services (externalities).
The literature on the brain drain has analyzed pretty thoroughly the
possible external diseconomies of a man's departure for economic rca-
sons. All of them depend on his having been expected to render public
services in excess of his expected income. Such externalities can be
p groupedinto three classes. First, the economies of scale from his mem-
:; bershipin a research team, a medical group, or small profession whose
output varies in greater proportion than the change in its membership.
• Second, spillovers from his practice of a particular profession, such as
public health medicine, agricultural engineering, or acting as judge or
policeman. However, such spillover benefits are resumed as soon as he
54 If marginal utility diminishes, a given percentage increase in income will be
more important to poor than to rich people.
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is replaced, in contrast to the third class—social benefits spilling over
from the personal capacity of a particular professional or scientist of such
quality that they will not be replaced by his routine replacement. This
class is important, but is it likely to be significant? Why should the emi-
grants be more socially fertile than their replacements? The case seems
to require a decline in quality from one generation to the next.
Full comments on these three cases are unnecessary in view of their
discussion in the literature. Note that in all of them these external losses
differ from and add to losses of consumers' surplus, taxable capacity, or
embodied capital, and that the wholesale departure of many educated
people may, in addition, lower the whole national average level of politi-
cal, cultural, and social aspiration, discussion, adjustability, and pro-
gressiveness.
Flow seriously they are to be rated depends on one's point of view.
A "cosmopolitan" will argue that each of them is likely to be balanced
by an equal gain in the country of destination,55 while a "nationalist" will
be sensitive only to his own country's status in a science or art. Further-
more, a cosmopolitan will point out the increased extent to which a
nation can be helped by its former scientists and innovators working in
the more productive environment of the richer nations, relying on the
international transmission of ideas56 to send the techniques back home,
while a nationalist will insist upon the extent to which less developed
countries require local research and practice in domestic agricultural,
industrial, medical, social, and cultural problems. Finally, a cosmopolitan
will point to the gains in better or cheaper imports and from the flow of
advisers and experts, while a nationalist will maintain that economic
development cannot flow from improved imports but only from improved
production, and that the technical assistance of uncommitted visiting
experts is of value only for specific projects such as dams and canals.
The entire externalities-of-emigration literature is useful in raising
questions about educational "requirements" now being studied in the
educational planning of less developed countries. Otherwise, its value lies
chiefly in suggesting categories for the analysis of the contribution of
education to economic growth.
Johnson, in "Some Economic Aspects..,"investigatesthe extent to which the
losses and gains will balance each other.
"The Economics of the 'Brain Drain': The Canadian Case."
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4.Aiding economic growth.Each nation,in addition to maximiz-
ing, by allocation and combination, the amount of national output per
head, seeks to grow—especially when suffering from the brain drain.
A nation's concern about the emigration of highly qualified people,
therefore, may not be a reflection of its static losses of consumption or
of capital, but a manifestation of its belief in a slowing down of its
development.
That the outflow of human capital could cause a slowing down of
economic growth is not in doubt. On the one hand, statistical analyses
of national growth rates have been forced to attribute part of economic
growth to the "residual factor," which is presumed to be knowledge, or
education. On the other hand, it is plausible to construct neoclassical
growth models in which investment in human capital, at the same rate
of return as investment in capital goods, produces an equilibrium growth
rate which is a function of the common rate of return. At the most basic
level of theory, expanding population requires more capital, even to stand
still. A brain drain, by definition, spills more capital than people. All
this is commonplace in growth theory and development economics.
What is less investigated is the cause. To what extent is the presence
of a group of scientists and engineers a cause of growth, as opposed to
being either a precondition, or a consequence, of growth? Professionals
organize, adjust, apply, and innovate. Both to reach the production-
possibilities frontier and to advance it require sophisticated and trained
personnel. Does the drift of such personnel toward richer countries actu-
ally prevent this optimizing and shifting? Or does the drift merely sym-
bolize a failure of energy and will in the economy, so that the trained
personnel, as a group, lose interest and incentive?
We must leave this question to developmental specialists, with two
• observations. First, it is possible that the emigration and scarcity of pro-
fessionals trained to deal with the specific technical problems of a country
—its soils, insects, diseases, climate, and so forth—may actually slow
down a growing country's growth rate. A drain of potential local experts,
in other words, may create a series of bottlenecks which will impede
progress for generations. Health questions apart, however, it is difficult
to think of convincing illustrations.
Second, the most serious source of some countries' brain drain is
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abroad, the country would gain no specialists at all, and growth would
presumably fail. Hence, unless all training is to be undertaken at home,
growth is impossible without some seepage abroad from the training
program.
However, it has not yet been proved that economic growth requires
any technical experts from the growing country. A nation determined to
grow, putting more weight on growth than on having its own corps of
experts, professionals, and scientists, and having the will to work and
save, can import engineers and scientists, either as immigrants or as short-
term consultants, in unlimited numbers. What it then may lack are
middle-level technologists, nurses, midwives, high school teachers, civil
servants, and entrepreneurs; but these are not the raw materials of the
brain drain.Preventing the brain drain, and encouraging economic
growth, are not the same policy.
IS THERE A BRAIN-DRAIN POLICY QUESTION
DEPENDING ON HUMAN CAPITAL MEASUREMENTS?
IN these concluding paragraphs,I turn to the justification of some
recent research in which, along with Herbert Grubel, Burton Weisbrod,
Rashi Fein, Robert Myers, and Mary Jean Bowman, I have been in-
volved. My general point is that the values obtained have little or no
value for justifying policy about migration of highly qualiiied persons.
Elsewhere, Grubel and I have argued that what should be important
to a nation is the maximization of income per capita, either of all mem-
-: bers of the society, or of those remaining after emigration of a few.
Originally, we meant merely to assert this aim against those who would
claim that, regardless of population, "bigger GNP is better" in a nation's
policy. We were surprised to find that some contemporaries do not agree
with us, especially those who attempt some kind of decision-making cal-
culus using as a measure of benefits the total of private incomes (for
simplicity we assume there are no spillovers). Although they sometimes
make little use of it, this assumption is found in the work of Weisbrod,
Bowman and Myers, Holtmann, and Berry and Soligo.
In any case, an income, or income per capita, maximization is
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assumed to be the chief policy aim in the brain-drain literature. My brief
references to policy in the earlier parts of this paper have implied a belief
that most countries and most authors accept this aim.
Now, what is gained by measuring the value of the human capital
in migration? When one realizes that human-capital evaluations require
full information about training, age, and other factors, it is obvious that
policy-makers must already be aware of the flows involved. Little that is
new can come out of the total or its parts.
For example, consider the theoretical studies referred to earlier.
They conclude that the remaining population gains or loses by emigra-
tion depending on whether each emigrant has more or less human capital
embodied in him than the capital (of all types) per head in the national
endowment. A paper by Grubel and Scott has actually attempted some
rough measurement to determine whether the United States gains or loses
by immigration. But to what purpose? No one has argued that U. S.
immigration policy should be such as to admit only migrants who have
more than the average existing capital per head; and an abstract argu-
ment about the aims of migration policy, were it to be staged, would not
be clarified by such measurement. Nor does any country's schooling or
emigration policy now turn on the capital-embodied characteristic of the
• emigrants.
In another example, I have myself measured the balance of indebt-
edness in the exchange of academic economists between the United States
• and Canada, in an attempt to discover which country has made the
greatest gift of human capital to the other in rearing costs, schooling, and
foregone output. (A similar calculation could be made in terms of
• expected future income.) The results show that Canada owes more to
United States than the United States to Canada—an interesting and,
to most brain-drain conscious Canadians, unexpected result. However,
this fact hasno importance; Canada will train more or fewer of its own
•
economists for reasons other than to try to correct this imbalance. And
so it goes. When the primary aim is the simple one of maximizing income
per head, the net value of moving human capital is not a useful guide.
If one now considers other aims, such as achieving a favorable dis-
tribution of income before or after a migration, or avoiding undesired
external effects, one comes to the same conclusion about the calculation
of the amount of migrating human capital:it simply is not important.
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(And nobody has yet advanced the hypothesis that the value of migrating
human capital would be a better dependent variable than the number of
migrants to be explained in an econometric study.)
In short, I believe that human-capital migration valuations have
only two useful purposes, and these are not very urgent.
First and less important, countries which have a guilty conscience
about the numbers of trained men they are receiving as "gifts" or as
"loot" from poorer countries may be better able to persuade themselves
to aid the sending nations if they can value the human capital in the brain
drain than if they cannot. This statement is hardly open to argument—
it is merely a hypothesis about what voters and statesmen find persuasive
or compelling. Thus, Grubel and others have been publicizing the value
of human capital embodied in foreign students who decide not to return
home. It has been found that such estimates help to bring the loss of the
sending countries into some kind of perspective, although this perspec-
tive must surely be inappropriate for policy formation.
Second and more important, countries which receive highly qualified
emigrants from other countries may be inclined to enter into negotiations
to compensate the senders for their gift or loss. The bargainers will cer-
tainly look for some standard estimates which can be easily understood
and verified; the cost-of-human-capital figures meet these requirements.
Thus, the sending country might argue that the capital embodied in the
migrants is an estimate of the amount of capital which might have been
used for other purposes and therefore is at least a rough indicator of the
present value of future incomes it lost (forgetting that most of it would
have been consumed by the emigrant and his children). Or the sending
country might take a more grimly commercial view and offer to "export"
brains and skills at average cost. Finally, on some theoretical model or
other of economic growth, or of economies of scale, the sending country
might argue that the absence of the embodied capital has delayed or
prevented the growth of the incomes of the remaining population by a
certain fraction of the estimate of the gift.
No one can deny that hard figures, available to both sides, or in an
international clearinghouse, would expedite and simplify such negotia-
tions and might also help countries of origin, not only to agree to, but
also to encourage further migration. But is there any reason why the
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bargaining is bilateral, and both parties agree that migration is not to be
obstructed whatever the outcome of the bargaining, there is no reason
why the gaining country should ever pay the full value of the embodied
capital, or any particular fraction of it.If we assume instead that the
losing country threatens to stop the migratory flow unless it is compen-
sated, it may well be willing to accept something less than the full value
of the embodied human capital, for this full value is much more than the
remaining citizens (in the absence of spilovers) would expect to receive
from the emigrant if he stayed at home. On the other side, the gaining
country in the long run may be willing to pay whatever is needed to get
"brains" cheaper than by rearing and training them itself (and in the
short run to pay even more than this). Thus, the full value of embodied
capital might well be the upper limit of the range within which the bargain
will be struck. Only if the losing country regards itself as an "exporter"
of human capital would its similar estimate (at its own prices and costs)
also form the lower limit.
If the bargaining is multilateral, the different aims or problems of
each country cannot easily be handled through a single clearinghouse for
international human-capital compensation, and it is not very profitable
to speculate on how the nations might resolve to value the flows and
crossflows. Practice in a few international treaties on other subjects,
however, does suggest the diplomatic attractiveness of valuations "at
cost." Here again, then, one might see sums exchanged, and even see
schooling and migration policies adjusted on the basis of the message
of the values of human capital migrating.
These export or compensation schemes are remote and fanciful
possibilities. Any other benefit-cost calculation about educational expan-
J. sionor migration policy will not, in my opinion, involve human-capital




AnthonyScott has done an exceptional job of synthesizing the ele-
ments of the human-capital approach to international migration, and, in
most cases, I will merely add emphasis to points made, but not thor-
oughly discussed. First, with respect to the question of the determinants
of the decision to migrate and the question of a subsequent return home,
we may gain some insight by investigating the intentions of migrants.
This technique has already been adopted by demographers to predict
future population growth, and it might be a useful tool in estimating per-
manent migration. In one such study concerning intentions of Canadian
students in the United States, it was found that approximately 30 per
* centof the sample planned to remain in the United States after they
• completed their studies.1 In this study by Ronald Pavalko, the reasons
• given for planning to remain in the United States were mainly associated
with better job opportunities, as in the studies cited by Scott. Of course,
plans may change, and there is the question of what influences a person's
plans. Pavalko finds that the length of time the student is in the United
States is related to his plans to remain. For all male students, 20 per cent
of those who were in the United States less than one year plan to remain
after their schooling, but over 50 per cent of those who were in the
United States four or more years plan to remain after their schooling.
When students are classified as graduate students and undergraduate stu-
dents, there is still a strong relationship between length of time spent in
the United States and plans to remain in the United States.
These findings seem to support the general type of model set up by
Bowman and Myers which suggests that the probability of returning home
decreases with the number of years spent away from home. In any case,
more detailed studies of migrants' attitudes would help in reducing the
1 Ronald Pavalko, "Talent Migration: American Students in the United States."
International Review o/Education, No. 3, 1968,pp. 300—24.
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Figure1."Dead-Weight" Loss Resulting From





NOTE:Loss is triangle abc described by (1) linear decreas-
ing marginal physical product function /'(x);(2) shiftin
supply of factor x from S0 to S1. x0—x1; and (3)factorpay-
ment w0—w1, equal to marginal product.
statistical overestimation of permanent migration, and would offer more
evidence on the determinants of the decision to migrate.
The environmental factor influencing migration, mentioned by Scott,
might be approached by considering the studies of intranational migra-
tion. For example, a study of new migrants to the Cape Kennedy area
showed that health and climate considerations were most important after
those factors associated with jobs were considered. However, better
• schools were given a very low rating.2 One can, of course, suggest a
whole host of reasons for these results, but my purpose is not to explore
the study in detail. It is interesting to note that the findings might sug-
gest that there islittle in the controlled environment that influences
2CharlesM. Grigg, et a!.. NASA Impact on Brevard County, Tallahassee, Insti-
tute for Social Research, 1966, pp. 106-09.
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migration after jobopportunitieshave been considered. But the impor-
tant point is that economists might more often consider available attitude
studies in developing and testing their models concerning migration.
I should now like to turn to Scott's discussion of the theory of
migration and human capital. In this discussion, and in several of the
studies cited, a good deal of attention has been given to the "dead-weight
loss" associated with the migration of a factor of production. Figure 1
depicts this loss assuming: two factors of production; a shift in the supply
of the factor, X from S0 to S1; a linear decreasing marginal physical
product function, f'(x); and a factor payment, W, equal to the marginal
product. Then, the well known dead-weight loss is the triangle abc.
Othershave shown that diminishing returns and a nonmarginal change
in supply assures the loss. My purpose is not to debate the importance of
the dead-weight loss in any absolute sense, but to show that a small
weight given to the income distribution effect of migration may make the
dead-weight loss relatively unimportant.
In Figure 1, the income distribution of the nonmigrating owners of
factor X has been increased by and this has come at the expense
of the other factor of production. Now economists are not able to deter-
mine the proper income distribution, but a country may be concerned
with this shift, in the income distribution from one factor to another.
If we consider the ratio of the dead-weight loss to the income distribution
effect, we see that the ratio is rather small, except when the marginal
product functionisrather elastic.Writing the dead-weight lossas
and substituting e for the elasticity, we have the ratio of the
dead-weight loss to the income distribution effect, There-
fore, except when e is large, the ratio is rather small. At least in some
cases, then, the importance of the dead-weight loss will be swamped by
the importance of the income distribution considerations. In general, this
point has been ignored in the international migration literature, even
though it has been considered in the general economic literature.3
Considering Figure 1again, there is another point worth noting.
If we take the marginal product before migration as the loss associated
with a migrant, we underestimate the total loss by abc, but if we take the
See: 0. E. Williamson, "Economies as an Antitrust Defense," America,z Eco-
nomicReview,March 1968, p.28.r
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marginal product after migration as the loss associated with a migrant,
we will overestimate the total loss by adc.Whileit is the underestimate
that has been stressed in the literature, we may have little knowledge
about the direction of the bias in our empirical estimates of the loss.
Of course, either bias disappears in the limit. All of this also neglects the
question of the divergence between earnings and the marginal product
of a factor.
While my previous points may go beyond Scott's remarks to some
extent, they are in no way in conflict with his position as I see it. How-
ever, I believe his position on the nature of external effects is somewhat
different from mine. Scott seems to feel that if the external effects gen-
erated by an emigrating professional can be replaced by training another
professional, there is no further problem. There may or may not be a
loss to the home country when external effects are involved, but it has
nothing to do with simply retraining another man. In fact, the country
• may refuse to train another professional.
Assume that the country increases the subsidy to a given profession
until the subsidy to the last man is just equal to the marginal external
benefit that he confers on the country. Then in equilibrium we have
EB' Ko=)
• where K0 is the subsidy given in the initial period; EBt is the marginal
external benefit conferred on the country in all future periods 1;andr is
the discount rate. If the individual migrates immediately after the initial
period, the loss to the country is K0. Migration, in this case, may be
motivated by rewards offered by other countries to capture the external
effects. Then, the home country will continue to lose subsidized individ-
uals. However, if all countries offer rewards to attract foreign profes-
• sionals, this will be part of the price that all countries must pay for a
professional. In this case, individuals may be willing to pay for their own
• training,and countries merely buy professionals at the "market price."•
The loss to the country may only be a short-run problem. As a
country starts to find its trained men lured away, it will discontinue the
subsidy. This, however, assumes that the problem is just one of misjudg-
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Through the ballot, one group may force a subsidy for their training and,
e then, leave the country to maximize the private return to the profession.
e The nonprofessionals in the home country will continue to sustain losses
in the latter case. Scott's example of free training of British physicians
fits either case. Nonetheless, it becomes clear that there is more than a
t replacement problem.
Lastly, I would like to consider Scott's prognostication about the
usefulness of measures of human capital as an aid to policy concerning
the brain drain. At the outset, I should indicate that having a capital-
value measure of a migrant would eliminate some of the problems in
measuring the brain drain that he discussed in his paper. For example,
he states that children, no matter how intelligent, will not be counted as
part of the brain drain. But, of course, they should be counted as some
sort of drain if they embody certain capital investments in either them-
selves or their parents. Weisbrod has made a convincing case, in my
opinion, for considering the human-capital element in migration. He has
shown that the per capita capital value of a population may be a better
• guide to its welfare status than a per capita income measure.4
In my judgment, the emphasis at the conclusion of Scott's paper
was too greatly influenced by the brain drain or manpower approach to
international, migration. If one considers the amount of human capital
that a migrant represents, and not just the particular occupational label
that we attach to the individual, we may see that the measurement of
human capital is crucial. Such an approach will move us into questions
concerning capital theory, aggregate production functions, and economic
growth. Much of this, however, may not take us far from the question
• of externalities. It is my guess that investments in human capital raise
the marginal product of all the factors of production. In this case, a deci-
sion to migrate based on the private return to human capital may not be
optimal for society. Here, I rely on the type of theory of the production
• function,of the modifier, and of income distribution developed by
Frankel.5 Simply stated, the private return to human capital or physical
capital is low because part of this return goes to labor as a sort of auto-
4 Burton A. Weisbrod, 'An Expected Income Measure of Economic Welfare,"
Journalof Political Economy,August 1962, pp. 355—67.
Marvin Frankel, "The Production Function: Allocation and Growth," American
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matic transfer payment. Without trying to develop any analytical frame-
work here, I suggest the aggregate production function analysis of Solow,
Frankel, Griliches, Nelson and Phelps, and others, will more and more
introduce concepts of human capital to explain growthinoutput.
Measures of the stock of human capital will be needed to test the theory,
and the loss of human capital through migration may be found to be
critical in determining the economic growth of a country. In fairness to
Scott, I feel he is discussing the limited use of human-capital measures
in present policy decisions, but this should not be generalized to future
policy decisions as if economic theory will have no influence.
LARRYA. SJAASTAD
UNIVERSITYOF CHICAGO
Anthony Scott's style in his brain-drain paper is reminiscent of Lyn-
don Johnson's March 31 speech. Nothing in the previous fifty-one pages
prepares one for the sudden conclusion that prior research on the brain-
drain issue has "little or no value for justifying policy about migration
of highly qualified persons." I believe that this conclusion has a great
deal of merit; much of the manipulation of statistics found in the brain-
drain literature has little relevance for policy, nor do the policy recom-
'• mendationsof Walter Adams, er aL, seem to be based upon hard esti-
mates of costs and benefits. I further believe that this state of affairs
derives from an overemphasis on the construction of estimates of popu-
lation and human capital flows and a neglect of the identification of the
• real economic issues and end use for the figures by the manipulators of
statistics. The issues have been laid out rather clearly by Harry Johnson
and others, and Professor Scott certainly does draw attention to them,
although I wish he had added some elaboration. It is in this direction
that I cast this brief comment.
In the first place, data on the numbers of warm bodies and the
amount of human capital involved in the international migration of pro-
fessionals are largely irrelevant until one has some measure of their sig-
nificance. Is a flow from Britain to the United States of one million
dollars of human capital per annum small, and one of 100 million large?
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Idon't see how one can judge until some estimate of the true transfer
is made.
There are, I believe, only two economically interesting measures of
the effect of the brain drain. The first is the (largely irrelevant) direct
transfer and the second involves externalities. When the state causes the
private costs of acquiring an advanced degree to be less than the social
costs, the ultimate effect is that earnings of persons holding those degrees
will be lower than they would be if the private costs equalled the social.
To the extent that social costs and the discrepancy between private and
social costs of training differ among countries, incentives are set up for
immigration. If, as appears to be the case, the private and social costs
of training are both lower in poorer countries (due to lower alternative
costs) and if, as also appears to be the case, the poorer countries indulge
themselves in larger (relative) subsidies to the training of professionals
than do the richer countries, one has a situation in which the poorer
countries have a comparative advantage in (at least partial) training of
professionals—this effect being reinforced by very high rates of public
subsidization of that training—and the richer countries offer the more
lucrative markets for the finished product. The resultant population flows
stemming from these incentives cause alarm when they reach the high
levels claimed to have accompanied the United States' great scientific
leap forward since Sputnik. The alarm would appear to be a result of
certain people collecting rents that the bureaucrats had not anticipated.
Governments that lament the outflow of trained professionals and simul-
taneously ensure that an ample supply (via free education) be available
at "fair" or even fixed prices require instruction to be sure, but that
instruction does not require the benefit of brain-drain research. I believe
that this is part of the message of Scott's last five pages.
The direct transfer, then, is not between nations, as a superficial
reading of much of the brain-drain literature would lead one to believe,
but rather it is a transfer from one subgroup of individuals of one nation
to another subgroup of that same nation. Although public education
imposes upon us the collective burden of paying for the education of
our children, it\4oes not require us to repay the costs of our own train-
ing, hence the transfer. (As this transfer is usually made quite willingly,
-it strains the language somewhat to refer to it as a burden.) The transferr
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calls forth complaints only when the beneficiaries seek out—at home or type
abroad—higher rates of remuneration. In the case of immigration, which
usually involves partial or total shift of political allegiance from one state pend
to another, the transfer becomes a burden in the sense that it would not be bi
be freely made if they had it to do over again. But in any case, the prob:
transfer remains between individuals rather than between nations (ex- impo
cept in some accounting sense). That is, the fact that British taxpayers this
have financed the education of a Manhattan physician need not directly widej
enhance the welfare of the United States taxpayer. Hence a measure of fessk
the brain drain made in terms of training costs is relevant as an estimate is liti
of the transfer from taxpayers to students and does reflect to some extent that:
an international capital flow, but does not reflect an international income
flow in any economically relevant sense. A recent reading of the Preface
and Foreword to Adam's Brain Drain moves me to state this banality.
We are left then with the externality, or rather the two externalities.
First, a brain drain of any importance wifi presumably have as one con-
sequence some internal redistribution of income via changes in factor
prices in both the sending and the receiving countries. We know virtually
nothing of the nature and magnitude of this redistribution, but perhaps
we can learn something by a production-function approach of the
Griliches type. This internal redistribution, however, has little to do with
the glamor of the brain drain, as the sex appeal of the latter lies largely
in the alleged international redistribution of income (and wealth) it pro-
motes. The second and more interesting externality is the effect on per
capita output of the changing factor proportions—the familiar triangle
economics. Here we have for the first time some real possibility of inter-
national transfers of income, as a brain-drain induced decline in per
capita income of nonimmigrants of the one country will tend to be
matched by an induced increase in the per capita income of nonemigrants
of the other. Here again our ignorance is impressive, as we have as yet
neither the tools nor the numbers to make a good estimate (except pos-
sibly for the work of Mishan, which I have not seen).
In summary, I concur with Professor Scott's conclusion that brain-
drain research to date has turned up little of significance, particularly
for policy, but I am less pessimistic than he seems to be concerning the
usefulness of potential research in this area. Estimation of the extent and
magnitude of brain-drain induced international income transfers of the
-pr
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me or type mentioned in the immediately preceding paragraph would be an
which interesting research undertaking, one which could be carried out inde-
state pendently of the nationalist-internationalist controversy, which I find to
M not be both stale and distracting from the relevant issues. Such research will
e, the probably come as little comfort to those who emphasize the strategic
(ex- importance of professionals in the growth process; my only comment in
,ayers this connection is that one spin-off of the brain-drain event has been a
jrectlY wider recognition of the international character of the market for pro-
fessionals. If professionals are indeed important to growth, then there
Lunate is little to prevent the country in need from meeting its requirements in
extent that market.
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